Established in 1914, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was charged with policing “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Designed to represent more than one political perspective, the FTC Act mandated that there be five commissioners, but no more than three may belong to the same political party. Each commissioner is appointed for a term of seven years, and the statute further provides that “[a]ny commissioner may be removed by the president for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
The constitutionality of this limitation on a president’s ability to remove a commissioner was discussed previously in Part I of this series. After President Trump fired two Democratic commissioners over policy disputes, as opposed to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” the Supreme Court affirmed President Trump’s ability to expressly overruling a 91-year old precedent.
Undoubtedly, the decision may have a profound impact on several agencies. But focusing on the FTC, the decision is about much more than who sits on the FTC—it fundamentally changes the FTC’s relationship with the White House, and by extension with the business community at large.
Below are five areas where the future FTC may look (and act) quite differently from the agency to which we have become accustomed.
1. The FTC becomes more directly accountable to the president
FTC commissioners serve staggered seven-year terms and, until recently, could be removed only for cause. Historically, presidents were able to influence the commission through the voluntary resignation of the outgoing president’s designated chair, or by waiting for fixed seven-year terms to expire. The practical result was a degree of continuity across administrations and some insulation from political pressure.
After Trump v. Slaughter, commissioners can be removed because of policy disagreements rather than misconduct or neglect of duty. The president therefore has substantially greater leverage over the agency’s leadership and direction. The practical implication is that FTC policy may become more closely aligned with the priorities of the sitting administration.
2. Antitrust enforcement may become more politically responsive
The FTC’s core antitrust authority remains unchanged. The agency still reviews mergers, investigates conduct, and litigates competition cases. What changes, however, is the ability of a new administration to reshape those priorities quickly by replacing commissioners and leadership. Future administrations may be able to pivot more rapidly on questions such as:
- Merger enforcement intensity
- Vertical merger policy
- Labor-market antitrust issues
- Technology platform investigations
- Use of FTC rulemaking authority
- Consumer protection priorities
The FTC could therefore experience larger swings in enforcement philosophy from one administration to the next. This could have a more chilling effect than in the past on certain business practices or transactions towards the end of one administration while the business community waits to see what enforcement agenda the new administration announces.
3. The FTC may look more like DOJ antitrust
Historically, many observers viewed the FTC as somewhat more insulated from electoral politics than the Antitrust Division because of the commission structure and removal protections. One consequence of Slaughter may be that the FTC and DOJ become more similar institutionally:
- Both remain executive-branch antitrust enforcers
- Both become more responsive to presidential priorities
- Both may see more substantial leadership transitions across administrations
That does not mean the agencies will always reach identical outcomes, but the distinction between an “independent” FTC and an executive-branch DOJ is narrower than it was before June 2026. (As for the question that must be asked “Do we still need an FTC?”, stay tuned for Part III)
4. Increased litigation challenging agency structure and actions
The decision is likely to generate further constitutional litigation involving the FTC and other independent agencies.
Parties subject to FTC investigations or enforcement actions may test:
- Whether other structural protections remain valid
- Whether prior precedents relying on Humphrey’s Executor survive
- Whether additional aspects of agency independence are constitutionally vulnerable
The decision does not answer all of those questions, but it provides a powerful new framework for litigants to challenge agency structures.
5. Potential effects on business planning
For clients, the biggest takeaway is not necessarily more or less enforcement—it is greater uncertainty and faster policy change.
Businesses planning transactions, compliance programs, or regulatory strategies may need to place greater weight on:
- Election outcomes
- Presidential transitions
- Changes in FTC leadership
- Shifts in agency enforcement priorities
The FTC’s substantive statutory authority remains intact, but the likelihood of sharp changes in policy direction may increase.
Key takeaway
The most significant consequence of Trump v. Slaughter may not be the removal of any particular commissioner, but the transformation of the FTC from a comparatively insulated independent regulator into an agency more directly accountable to the president. While the Federal Trade Commission retains its statutory antitrust and consumer protection authorities, future administrations will likely possess greater ability to reshape the agency’s leadership, priorities, and enforcement agenda. For businesses, the result may be increased volatility in regulatory policy and a closer connection between antitrust enforcement and presidential priorities.
Part 3 in this series will discuss the reasons for, and against, maintaining the FTC as an enforcement agency.
If you have any questions, please contact Jay at 202-778-3021 or jlevine@porterwright.com
